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Abstract 
 
Research evidence on the impact of relative income position on individual attitudes and 
behaviour is sorely lacking. Therefore, this paper assesses such positional impact on social 
capital by applying 14 different measurements to International Social Survey Programme data 
from 25 countries. We find support for a positional concern effect or ‘envy’ whose magnitude 
in several cases is quite substantial. The results indicate that such an effect is non-linear. In 
addition, we find an indication that absolute income level is also relevant. Lastly, changing 
the reference group (regional versus national) produces no significant differences in the 
results.  
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Envy ... is a subtle and powerful feeling, motivating everything from political 
movements to murders.  
(Richard Zeckhauser, 1991,  p. 9)
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
The subject of envy and its social repercussions has long preoccupied human secular self-
reflection and contemplation.1 In economics theory, Adam Smith (1759/1976), like his 
successors Karl Marx (1849) and Thorstein Veblen (1899), emphasized the importance of 
relative position and social concerns. Since then, these ideas have been stressed by modern 
economists such as Arthur Pigou (1920), John Maynard Keynes (1930), James Duesenberry 
(1949) and Harvey Leibenstein (1950). In contrast to the traditional standard utility theory 
position that individuals evaluate their welfare only in absolute terms, the theory of envy 
creation assumes that individual welfare depends on comparisons with others. Whereas Smith 
(1759/1976) proposed relative wants as central to human behaviour and Marx (1849) 
emphasized that humans measure their wants and pleasure in relation to society, Veblen’s 
(1899) concepts of conspicuous leisure and consumption stress the importance of an 
individual’s relative position in society. Subsequently, by developing a utility concept 
characterized by systematically interdependent utilities, Duesenberry (1949) incorporated 
relative preferences into consumer theory. Even Marshall (1961), often seen as the creator of 
modern demand theory, notes the relevance of human distinction, while Leibenstein (1950) 
stresses the non-fiction demand for consumption goods due to, for example, a bandwagon 
effect in which others’ behaviour affects individual choices.  
                                                 
1 In the ancient world, Aristotle (1924) treated envy in his Rhetoric. During the age of enlightenment, Immanuel 
Kant, in his 1785 Metaphysics of Morals, and Francis Bacon, in his 1625 Of Envy, discussed in detail the 
psychology of ingratitude and schadenfreude, provided well-developed definitions of envy and emphasized the 
importance of social comparisons. Other, modern classical philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, or 
Nietzsche have also stressed the function of envy in human society.   
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It is therefore surprising that many economists have largely neglected this topic. In 
particular, there is a dearth of empirical research into the impact of relative income position 
on individual attitudes and behaviour (see Senik, 2005). Moreover, of the studies on relative 
income position that do exist, most focus on its association with happiness rather than its 
impact on social capital. To remedy this research void, this paper uses 14 different measures 
covering four different dimensions to produce detailed evidence on the relation between 
income position and several aspects of social capital.  
Besides its narrow focus, the empirical research on the impact of envy or positional 
concerns has also been hindered by lack of data or inadequate methodology. As Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2005) points out, “[m]ost economists have used (and are fond of) cross-section 
micro-empirical data, i.e., data at the individual level and for only one country” (p. 998). 
However, not only do relatively new international survey data sources now allow detailed 
investigation of social capital for a variety of countries, but more sophisticated statistical 
techniques and designs are also enabling researchers to take advantage of cross-national 
variations in these data.  
Our study overcomes methodological shortcomings by using survey data from the 
1998 wave (RELIGION II) of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which not 
only covers approximately 24,000 persons in 25 countries but, in contrast to other ISSP 
waves, asks many questions related to various aspects of social capital. Moreover, in line with 
some previous studies, we include an almost complete set of control variables to better isolate 
partial correlations between relative income position and social capital.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
approach and predictions. Section 3 describes the dataset, and Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. The Effect of Relative Income Position on Social Capital 
 
 
2.1 The Role of Relative Income Position and Envy in Society 
 
In social science theory, positional concerns have historically been thought to play a role in 
the interaction between people meaning that many economic and social phenomena might be 
explained by the interdependence of individuals’ utilities. Since Kant’s (1785/1964) early 
emphasis on the importance of social comparisons, social psychology, sociology and 
anthropology have also traditionally placed much emphasis on the relevance and 
fundamentality of relative preferences to human motivation (see, e.g., Festinger, 1954 for the 
theory of social comparison; Stouffer, 1949 for the theory of relative deprivation). In addition, 
several economists have elaborated on the concept of interdependent preferences, whose 
inclusion in economic theory allows social comparisons (e.g., Becker, 1974; Easterlin, 1974; 
Scitovsky, 1976; Schelling, 1978; Pollak, 1976; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Frank, 1985; 
Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). According to Frank (1991), not only do individual decisions have 
important consequences for the individual concerned, but they also generate what he terms 
positional externalities. To illustrate, he shows how such welfare comparisons between 
individuals help explain the existence of such diverse elements as 24-hour supermarkets, 
excessive formalism in economics, cycles of fashion and public spiritedness, muddled 
bureaucratic language, excessive cosmetic surgery and pressures to consume growth 
hormones. He concludes that “…the more we learn about them, the more likely it seems that 
actions without external effects may be the real exceptions” (p. 44). McAdams (1992) points 
out that social scientists have challenged the concept of selfishness “primarily by exploring 
ways in which preferences are positively dependent on each other, as when empathy, 
altruism, or moral commitment cause one person to desire that others be able to satisfy their 
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own desires. Much less has been said about the extent to which preferences are negatively 
interdependent, and the economic consequences of such preferences” (p. 3).  
In theory, not all positional concerns translate automatically into envy. Rather, envy is 
generated by positional concerns only when the individual’s current situation is below his or 
her own aspiration level. In philosophy, in which envy has been viewed “as one of the 
inescapable questions of existence” (Schoeck, 1966, p. 194), it is Kant (1785/1964) who 
perhaps provides the most well-developed definition:  
Envy (livor) is a tendency to perceive with displeasure the good of others, 
although it in no way detracts from one’s own, and which, when it leads to 
action (in order to diminish that good) is called qualified envy, but 
otherwise only ill-will (invidentia); it is however only an indirect, 
malevolent frame of mind, namely a disinclination to see our own good 
overshadowed by the good of others, because we take its measure not 
from its intrinsic worth, but by comparison with the good of others and 
then go on to symbolize that evaluation. (Cited in Schoeck 1966, p. 201)  
Ainslie (1992) argues that “[p]utting oneself in another’s shoes may offer a single, 
distinct, and thus robust alternative to the perception of life in one’s own shoes. This 
alternative perception of reality is experienced as envy” (p. 323). Not only do social scientists 
– including social psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists – stress 
the important role of envy in everyday life (e.g., Foster, 1967; Elster, 1991), but several 
economists, primarily in 1970s literature on welfare economics, also discuss the significance 
of envy (e.g., Foley, 1967; Brennan, 1973; Varian, 1974; Archibald and Donaldson, 1979). 
Subsequently, using a rational choice framework, Mui (1995) incorporates envy into standard 
economic theory to explore agents’ sabotage or retaliative behaviour against others.  
In real life, individuals’ relative judgments of their own positions do appear 
commonplace (see Frank, 1985; Frank and Sunstein, 2001; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; 
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Zeckhauser, 1991; Tversky and Griffing, 1993; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002 and Alpizar et 
al., 2005). That is, people tend to compare themselves with their environment and care greatly 
about their relative position, which in turn influences their attitudes and observable behaviour. 
Moreover, as German social scientist Helmut Schoeck (1966) amply demonstrates, envy is a 
widespread social phenomenon that engenders myriad everyday actions aimed at reducing it. 
For example, school uniforms are thought to reduce possible envy among pupils and 
schoolteachers may ask parents not to incite envy in classmates by packing special treats in 
their children’s lunchboxes (Elster, 1991). An extreme example of envy reduction occurred in 
China during the Cultural Revolution when farmers owning fruit trees were ordered to cut 
them down (Zhang and Sang, 1987, cited in Elster, 1991).  
Indeed, systematic tests carried out by psychologists and economic psychologists 
suggest that people do take into account relative income position when making real life 
decisions such as choosing between two earning schemes. Economic psychologists Frank and 
Sunstein (2001) hypothesize two possible worlds: in world A, the individual earns $110,000 a 
year, while colleagues earn $200,000; in alternative world B, the individual earns less than in 
world A ($100,000 per year), but the others earn only $85,000 (p. 336). In a traditional 
economic approach, world A should be preferable because it offers higher absolute 
consumption. However, the choices made by test subjects paint a different picture – that is, a 
substantial number of respondents opted for world B, thereby confirming Frank’s (1985) 
earlier findings using similar tests. Solnick and Hemenway (1998), who test 257 faculty, 
students and staff members at Harvard School of Public Health using a similar scenario, find 
that approximately 50 percent of their respondents preferred the world in which they had a 
higher relative income position. Likewise, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. 
(2005) find evidence that absolute and relative income, as well as consumption, matter for 
individual utility or well-being. Finally, Tversky and Griffin (1993), in a study of the relation 
between envy and happiness, observe that 85 percent of their test subjects chose the world 
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with the higher absolute salary and the lower relative position. However, interestingly, 62 
percent anticipated a higher job satisfaction in the world with the higher relative income 
position. Similar results are also reported for comparisons at the macro level (e.g., 
Zeckhauser, 1991).  
Experimental economists have also discovered the relevance of incorporating envy 
into such research tasks as explaining outcomes in ultimatum games in which two or more 
persons must agree on how to share a given amount of money (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994). 
Frank and Sunstein (2001) stress that “… preference for good relative position does not 
explain all of what occurs in the game; ensuring a fair outcome, which may or may not call 
for good relative position, is often the driving factor. But relative position also counts for 
many participants, so much so that ‘difference aversion’ appears to motivate a significant 
percentage of participants” (p. 344). A decade earlier, Elster (1991) had even gone so far as to 
criticize the sense of fairness that characterizes experimental evidence from ultimatum games, 
suggesting that a sense of envy “would sometimes be more appropriate for analogous 
behavior in real life” (p. 66). Thus, the welfare of an envious person increases the danger that 
others’ assets will be destroyed, even when such destruction has its own costs. 
 
 
2.2 Dependent Variables: Social Capital 
 
Economists have discovered social capital – widely studied and highly prominent in all social 
sciences – to be an important determinant of economic phenomena like macroeconomic 
performance. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997), in a cross-sectional analysis, find a 
strong and significantly positive relationship between social capital variables (civic duty) and 
economic growth. Schaltegger and Torgler (2005), using data for a synthetic panel of Swiss 
cantons over the 1981–2001 period, show that trust enhances fiscal performance. As regards 
public finance, Slemrod (1998) argues that social capital – measured as the willingness to pay 
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taxes voluntarily – lowers the cost of government operations and of equitably assigning such 
cost to citizens. Such research justifies a closer look at what shapes social capital.  
 The notion of social capital encompasses multiple aspects; however, the traditional 
social capital variable ‘trust’ is viewed as having two facets: trust among people and the 
people’s trust in national institutions (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; Knack, 2000; Uslaner, 
2002). Therefore, the following discussion focuses on four dimensions: trust between people 
and trust of the people in institutions, social norms and/or networks (Putnam, 2001; 
Bjørnskov, 2005).  
Because generalized trust, the belief that most people can be trusted, does not depend 
on a specific individual or on group characteristics (see, e.g., Uslaner, 2002), we measure it 
using the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted 
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”. Generalized trust is also expressed 
by the perception of others’ fairness towards oneself (e.g., “How often do you think that 
people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance and how often would they try 
to be fair?”).  
Whereas generalized trust is shaped by the horizontal relation between citizens, trust 
in state institutions is a key factor in measuring the vertical interaction between citizens and 
the state. Thus, in a further step, we also include four questions – such as “How much 
confidence do you have in institution X?” – to test several facets of particularized or 
institutional trust. The important institutions  to be analyzed are parliament, the courts and 
legal system, businesses and industries, and social institutions like the church and religious 
organizations. 
 The second dimension of social capital, compliance with social norms, is measured 
using questions related to tax morale, government benefit morale and compliance with legal 
norms. Because traditional economic models of tax evasion predict far too little compliance 
and far too much infringement, tax compliance seemingly depends on numerous factors that 
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go beyond standard economic concepts like deterrence. To resolve this conundrum, many 
researchers suggest that the intrinsic motivation for individuals to pay taxes – what in the 
literature is termed  ‘tax morale’ – helps explain these high levels of tax compliance (see, e.g., 
Lewis, 1982; Roth et al., 1989; Alm et al., 1992, 1999; Pommerehne et al., 1994; Frey, 1997, 
2003; Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 2002, 2003, 2005a, 2006a,b). Thus, in line with previous 
research (see Torgler, 2005b,c), we assess the level of tax morale using the following 
question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of his or her 
income in order to pay less income taxes?”. The benefit morale (see Halla and Schneider, 
2005) – that is, the acceptance of claiming government benefits without being entitled to them 
– we investigate in a similar manner. Compliance with legal norms like criminal and traffic 
laws is measured by the following moral dilemma: “Suppose you were riding in a car driven 
by a close friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a pedestrian. He asks you to tell the 
police that he was obeying the speed limit.” Thus, our social norm variables are proxies for 
three different ethical questions in daily life.  
 The networking aspect of social capital we measure by the level of civic engagement 
in voluntary work, such as charitable activities, religious and church-related activities, 
political activities and so forth. This set of social capital variables alone relates not to attitudes 
but to actual self-reported behaviour. Moreover, such activities generate more intense 
interactions between people, particularly between group members (Putnam, 2000). This 
networking aspect is measured by the following question: “How often in the last 12 months 
did you do volunteer in any of the following areas…?” Obviously, building up a social 
network through such interactions between people is linked to the degree of trust within a 
community. In addition, it seems probable that networks might generate positive externalities 
and thus more trust among and in those people who are not formally part of such 
organizations; for example, strangers in the community (Putnam, 2000). Nevertheless, 
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evidence for such externalities is not detectable in the empirical literature (for an overview, 
see Bjørnskov, 2005).  
Finally, we investigate happiness, a variable that cannot be interpreted as a social 
capital variable but that nevertheless has a strong connection with it. Specifically, social 
networks may have a strong positive impact on happiness (see, e.g., Baker, 2005) and so 
might generate trust among people and in institutions. Moreover, in contrast to the other 
variables, happiness, as alluded to earlier and shown in the next section, is a key variable in 
the research stream on the impact of relative income position. As such, happiness serves as a 
type of benchmark variable.  
 
 
2.3 Hypotheses: ‘Keeping Up with the Joneses’ 
 
This paper aims to test the importance of an individual’s relative income position, or envy, on 
the subjective social capital level. In general, the study assumes that individuals’ social capital 
and subjective well-being depends on the distance between their own and the reference 
group’s income. We formulate our formal hypotheses based on pioneer work in the happiness 
literature on the impact of relative income position. Not only do Clark and Oswald (1996) 
suggest that the dependence of happiness on relative income is “one of the most interesting 
ideas in social science” (p. 359), but Frank and Sunstein (2001) point to “happiness surveys 
conducted over time in a variety of countries” as “[p]erhaps the most striking evidence of the 
importance of relative position” (p. 337). Indeed, much happiness research finds strong 
evidence for the positive impact of the relative position on subjective well-being (Easterlin, 
1974, 1995, 2001; Clark and Oswald, 1996; Watson et al., 1996; Groot and van den Brink, 
1999; Tsou and Liu, 2001; McBride, 2001; Lyubomirsky, 2001; Stutzer, 2004; Kingdon and 
Knight, 2004; Dorn et al., 2005; Luttmer, 2005; Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Based on these 
happiness studies, we first predict the following: 
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 Hypothesis 1: Not being able to ‘keep up with the Joneses’ reduces an individual’s 
level of self-reported happiness. 
 
In addition, individuals’ positional concerns or the degree of envy may equally affect 
the generalized trust level; that is, the mutual trust among people. Most particularly, positional 
concerns are linked with frustration (“it could have or should have been me”) and the 
unhappiness and resignation of not being able to ‘keep up with the Joneses’. Such feelings 
may lead not only to distrust of the Joneses (i.e., the reference group) but also of other 
citizens, which reduces the generalized trust and the perceived fairness level. Based on these 
thoughts, we develop our second hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  Positional concerns (disadvantage in the relative income position) 
decrease people’s trust in others and their perceptions of others’ fairness.  
 
In addition, individuals may blame the state or its institutions for the relative income 
disadvantage they experience compared to the Joneses. Thus, frustration or resignation may 
lead not only to a decrease in trust at the horizontal level (generalized trust) but also at the 
vertical level; that is, the relation between the government and the citizen. The degree to 
which these social institutions are held responsible by individuals for their current social 
position may depend on the perceived degree to which the institution influences societal 
outcomes. For example, parliament is linked to the current politico-economic level; the courts 
and the legal system, to the constitutional level. Because of stronger long-term effects 
(blaming the ‘rules of the game’), we may expect a stronger impact of positional concerns on 
institutions at the constitutional level. On the other hand, short-term and unexpected policy 
changes are more prominent among the law-making bodies, where decision-making is faster 
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and new governments occur more often. The influence of these institutions at the current 
politico-economic level might be particularly strong when people have adjusted their 
aspiration levels to the long-term determinants of their social position. Moreover, because 
envy is a widespread phenomenon in the workplace (see, e.g., Layard, 2003; Elster, 1991; 
Frank and Sunstein, 2001), positional concerns may also affect many individuals’ trust in the 
environment of business and industry in which they are involved daily. In other words, 
individuals may blame business or industry for their relative income disadvantage, which 
could lead to a decreased level of trust in that social sector. Thus, our third hypothesis 
suggests the following: 
 
Hypothesis 3: A decrease in relative income position lowers trust in societal 
institutions such as the courts, parliament and business and  industry.  
 
In contrast, religious institutions provide moral constitutions for a society. On the one 
hand, religion acts as a type of ‘supernatural police’ that provides a certain level of enforced 
compliance with socially accepted rules (Anderson and Tollison, 1992). Equally, it 
encourages the production of social goods such as moral behaviour rooted in, for example, the 
Ten Commandments (Hull and Bold, 1994). On the other hand (and more specifically), envy 
may be controlled and restrained by religion. Fundamentally, all world religions teach the 
avoidance of envy. For example, according to Jewish tradition, causing others to feel ashamed 
and creating envy through one’s own behaviour is unlawful. Similarly, in the Qur’an, 
Mohammed describes envy as a sickness and the “shearer of religion”. Buddhism regards 
envy as one of the so-called five poisons that may lead to continuous re-birth and must 
therefore be overcome. In Hinduism, the avoidance of envy is a yama, an advised restraint 
(rather than a commandment) that should be followed. As regards Christianity, Schoeck 
(1966) points out the following:  
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The ethic taught by the New Testament sought to secure differentiated human 
existence in a world full of envious people and unlikely to evolve into a 
society of equals … Again and again we find parables the tenor of which is 
quite clearly the immorality, the sin of envy. … In the West, the historical 
achievement of this Christian ethic is to have encouraged and protected, if not 
to have been actually responsible for the extent of, the exercise of human 
creative powers through the control of envy. (pp. 159-160)  
 
We can therefore expect that positional concerns may not affect people’s trust in 
churches and religious organization because these provide mechanisms for catalyzing the 
feeling of envy. In addition, all religions have elaborated a sanctioning system that legitimizes 
and reinforces social values, providing support for toleration of inequality and legitimizing 
noticeable differences in individual circumstances in the interest of social peace. These 
observations lead to our fourth hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of trust in churches and religious organizations should not be 
affected by a disadvantage in relative income position.  
 
Social comparisons may also have an impact on willingness to comply with social and 
legal norms; for example, relative income position may affect willingness to pay taxes (tax 
morale). Frey and Torgler (2004), using survey data for 30 European countries, show that if 
taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, their tax morale decreases. If, however, they 
believe others to be honest, their tax morale increases. These findings indicate that taxpayers 
observe the pro-social behaviour of other taxpayers and pay their taxes conditionally. The 
extent to which others also contribute triggers greater or less cooperation and systematically 
influences an individual’s own willingness to comply. Thus, we may also observe social 
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comparison mechanisms related to the relative income position for compliance with social 
norms. A relative disadvantage may lead to a lower tax morale or benefit morale by creating 
dissatisfaction and a sense of distress over the discrepancy between the actual and the aspired-
to financial situation.  
In such a scenario, cheating the government by not paying taxes and claiming 
unjustified government benefits might serve as means for an ‘illegal’ income redistribution by 
the socially deprived. Indeed, there is evidence that such positional distress can cause a 
decrease in the level of tax morale (see Torgler, 2006a,b). Similarly, Torgler, Schmidt and 
Frey (2005) show empirically that the larger the income differences within a German soccer 
team, the worse the performance (i.e., effort to comply) of the single players. Yet, what of 
compliance with criminal and traffic law? If, as previous observations suggest, we can expect 
social capital to be positively affected by an advantage in relative income position, the same 
should be observed for a general compliance with law, even if the infringer is a close friend. 
Thus, our fifth hypothesis is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5: A better relative income position leads to a stronger willingness to obey 
the law and comply with norms.  
 
Lastly, voluntary participation in political organizations and activities might be caused 
by an incentive to express personal preferences or even change the social structure via 
political channels like redistribution policies. Similarly, an individual may become involved 
in institutions that correct or deal with relative social disadvantages through charitable (e.g. 
helping the sick, elderly or poor) or religious and church-related activities, even without 
benefiting directly from such action. Based on these thoughts, we develop our final 
hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 6: Positional concerns lead to more frequent active participation in 
voluntary activities, whether political, charitable or religious. 
 
 
3. Data  
 
This analysis uses a cross section of individual data from the 1998 ISSP survey, which 
contains various questions related to four dimensions of social capital – trust between people 
and people’s trust in social institutions, norms and networks. In addition, we include the 
happiness question as a generic measure of social capital. The categorical dependent variables 
have been recoded so that higher values correspond to higher levels of social capital. 
Important to our analysis is the fact that this dataset not only covers approximately 22,000 
observations from 25 countries but provides information on personal income, our variable of 
interest, and various additional socio-demographic variables usually employed in multivariate 
analyses of issues such as tax morale, health status or life satisfaction (see, e.g., Torgler, 
2006b and Dorn et al., 2005). To make income comparable across countries and persons, 
PPP-adjusted equivalent income in US dollars is calculated based on the World Penn Tables 
6.1 (Heston et al., 2002) and the modified OECD equivalence scale (Van Doorslaer and 
Masseria, 2004). National average income is computed as the average of the personal 
equivalence income observed in one country, and analogously, as the regional average income 
for regions. If fewer than 30 observations exist for one region, larger entities are formed for 
statistical inference. The subsistence income is measured as 40 percent of the average income 
of a country or region. Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Tables A1 to 
A3 of the appendix.  
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4. Model and Methodology 
 
In this cross-sectional model, we regard the level of social capital (Yi) as a function of the 
relative or absolute income position of an individual (Zi) and a vector of additional control 
variables (Vi)2 and error term (εi).3  
 
 Yi = β1Zi + β2Vi + εI               (1) 
 
To ensure comparability of the estimation results, computation for the various regressands 
employs the identical set of control variables (Vi). Our variable of interest, relative income 
position (Zi), is measured in four different ways: (1 & 2) the difference between an 
individual’s income and the national (subsistence) income (difference) and (3 & 4) the 
difference between the individual’s income and the regional (subsistence) income (income). 
In general, using a regional or national reference level is advantageous in that it is 
exogenously given for the single individual.  
 
Because any differences resulting from variations in the reference income might be 
interesting, we not only investigate the relationship between the relative income position and 
social capital at subsistence level and on average, we also employ a regional and national 
income benchmark model. The subsistence level as the benchmark income is expected to 
mirror the shape of a utility function4, while the average income seems intuitively more 
appealing for social comparison. The regional factor takes into account that income levels are 
not equally distributed within countries and people are more likely to compare their societal 
                                                 
2 Tables A1–A2 in the appendix provide a complete list of the dependent variables and the determinants. 
3 We are aware that cross-sections are subject to problems like endogeneity. Using individual data has the 
advantage that at least the macro determinants are not influenced by the behaviour of one single individual. 
4 This concept assumes that positive utility levels are attached to income at least as high as the subsistence level, 
which is not necessarily the case for income below this threshold.  
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position with that of close neighbours than with the rest of the world (Festinger, 1954; 
Stouffer, 1949). Moreover, without strong migration incentives to move between regions with 
different general levels of wealth, positional concerns and envy effects should be stronger for 
the regional benchmark model. One important, but often neglected, control variable is cultural 
background, which we proxy by language.5  
 Equation (1) is estimated with a weighted ordered probit estimation method; clustering 
at the regional or national level takes into account that the error terms of individuals living in 
the same country or region might be correlated because identical institutions and conditions 
are shared, which might otherwise bias the standard errors of the coefficients downward 
(Moulton, 1990). Application of weights makes the estimation results representative for the 
corresponding national population.  
 The set of income variables allows differentiation between the absolute and relative 
income hypothesis. If only relative income matters, the coefficient of the average or 
subsistence income should be zero. If absolute income matters, the coefficients of the 
reference group and the relative income should be both positive and identical. To test the 
relative income hypothesis against the absolute income hypothesis, we conduct a Wald-test on 
the difference between the two relevant coefficients after each regression. In addition, because 
the estimated coefficients only indicate the direction of the effect not its magnitude, we also 
compute marginal effects for the highest level of social capital.  
Finally, it can be argued that income comparisons are asymmetric (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2005; Duesenberry, 1949; Holländer, 2001; Frank, 1985). Therefore, the non-linearity of the 
effect of income on social capital is taken into account by the squared terms diff2pos6 and 
diff2neg7. It may well be that individuals below the reference income are more strongly 
                                                 
5 We form five cultural supra-national groups: Germanic languages, Northern Germanic languages, Balto-Slavic 
languages, and other non-English language. The reference category is English-speaking nations.  
6 diff2pos = square term of difference if difference > 0 otherwise 0.  
7 diff2neg = square term of difference if difference < 0, otherwise 0.  
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influenced by the relative income position, which leads to the expectation of a decreasing 
marginal utility of income for richer, but not poorer, individuals. 
 
 
5. Estimation Results  
 
 
5.1. Regional Income as a Benchmark of Comparison 
 
Happiness 
Table 1 reports the results for the case in which the regional subsistence income level serves 
as an individual’s benchmark for evaluating his or her relative income position. Table 1a, 
specifically, presents the results when regional average income is employed. The first 
dependent variable is our generic measure of ‘happiness’, which assumes that a higher level 
of social trust, better networks and well-targeted government activities may be transmission 
channels for citizen well-being. This dependent variable measures respondent happiness in 
four categories, with the highest category indicating the highest level of happiness.8 The 
results reveal that individual well-being not only rises with the regional subsistence level but 
also, and more significantly, with an increase in the relative income position. The marginal 
effects are relatively high, indicating a strong impact of difference and income with a 
probability of reporting the highest happiness level of 6.6 and 4.7 percentage points. Thus, the 
results indicate not only that absolute income level matters but that the relative income 
position is also important, which is in line with our hypothesis 1 and several previous findings 
in the happiness literature.  
                                                 
8 Original question: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you 
say you are, on the whole”. Possible answers were “very happy”, fairly happy”, “not very happy” and “not at all 
happy”. 
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The size of the marginal effects is one of the largest among the investigated measures 
of social capital, which indicates that our benchmark variable, happiness, provides one of the 
strongest position concern effects. Moreover, the negative sign of the positive difference 
squared indicates a decreasing marginal utility in income. Nevertheless, the Wald-test does 
not reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients for the two main income variables, which 
suggests that the absolute income level matters for happiness when the comparison income is 
the regional subsistence level. Table 1a also shows the estimation results and findings to be 
almost identical when the regional average income, rather than the subsistence level income, 
is employed. Only the marginal effect of relative income appears to be somewhat smaller 
(0.044 compared to 0.066), which can be assumed to reflect the fact that the distance between 
an individual’s income and the subsistence level is always greater than that between 
individual earnings and the higher average income. Thus, overall, these findings are 
consistent with the first hypothesis that a relatively worse income level decreases happiness.  
 
Generalized Trust 
The next set of regressands relates to generalized trust, the dimension of social capital that 
measures whether respondents believe that people in general can be trusted and how they 
evaluate the general level of fairness in society. The first question, related to generalized trust, 
asks respondents to assess the general degree of other people’s fairness towards themselves.9 
A low value for the categorical regressand reflects the view that ‘people take advantage all the 
time’, whereas the highest value indicates the answer ‘people are fair all the time’. In partial 
support of hypothesis 2, the regression outcome shows that perceived fairness increases with 
both the general income level and an individual’s relative income position. The marginal 
                                                 
9 Original question: “How often do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance and how often would they try to be fair?”. Possible answers were “try to take advantage of me all of the 
time”, “try to take advantage most of the time”, “try to be fair most of the time” or “try to be fair almost all of the 
time”. 
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effects also vary substantially between 5.1 (income) and 3.4 percentage points (difference) for 
the highest level of social capital.  
The non-rejection of the Wald-test provides evidence that it is the absolute individual 
income that matters most. The richer the individuals, the more they perceive others as acting 
fairly; in other words, envy generated by low levels of absolute income destroys social trust. 
For positive income differences, a decreasing marginal social capital of income is observable. 
In contrast, when the regional average income is used as the benchmark income, it is only the 
overall level of wealth in the society – no longer the relative income position – that positively 
affects social capital. Accordingly, the marginal effect of the average income (3.4 percentage 
points) is still substantial, but that for the relative income is considerably lower (0.8 
percentage points). However, in this case, the Wald-test on the income variables does not 
support the absolute income hypothesis.   
The second question asks whether people can generally be trusted or whether 
individuals should be careful.10 Again, the lowest category indicates a low level of trust. The 
regional average income level does not appear decisive for the trust level, but trust increases 
with an increase in the relative income position, which supports the impact of positional 
concerns. That is, the richer people are relative to their peers, the more they regard their 
environment as trustworthy. Thus, it is not the absolute but the relative level that apparently 
affects generalized trust. Moreover, the marginal effects are not negligible with 1.8 percentage 
points for the highest category. Nevertheless, the Wald-test on the income variables again 
fails to support the relative income hypothesis. For negative differences in income, the 
coefficient reveals an increasing marginal trust; whereas for positive differences, the estimate 
indicates a decreasing marginal trust. However, given the alternative income benchmark, both 
relative and absolute income become decisive and positive determinants of social trust. This 
                                                 
10 Original question: “Generally speaking, would you say that people ca be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers were “people can almost be trusted”, “people can usually be 
trusted”, “you usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people” or “you almost always can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people”.  
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result very much resembles that obtained for the alternative trust measure, yet with a focus on 
the regional subsistence level. Notwithstanding, the Wald-tests’ support of the absolute 
income hypothesis contradicts the observed significances of the coefficients.  
Overall, the results for the two trust variables are mixed as to whether the absolute or 
relative income hypothesis holds. In general, positional concerns appear strong and are 
quantitatively stronger when the regional subsistence level, rather than the regional average 
level, is used as the benchmark income. This finding strongly suggests that hypothesis 2 
cannot be rejected.  
 
Trust in State Institutions 
The third set of dependent variables measures the confidence in state institutions – 
specifically, the parliament, courts, business and the church – that represents the quality of the 
relationship between government and the respondent. Again, higher values for these variables 
indicate a higher level of confidence.11
Confidence in parliament is influenced by neither the general wealth of a society nor 
the relative income position of an individual. Nor, however, does confidence in courts depend 
on regional subsistence level. Rather, it is positively related to the relative income position: 
the relatively richer the individuals, the more they trust the country’s courts (and justice 
system). This outcome supports hypothesis 3. That is, envy appears to destroy public trust in 
institutions that the population assumes act more independently and more objectively than 
other institutions subject to political business and re-election cycles. For the highest trust 
level, the marginal effects are about 2 percentage points.  
Nevertheless, the Wald-test on the income variables cannot fully support the relative 
income hypothesis. Indeed, the results presented in Table 1a paint a totally different picture: 
                                                 
11 Original question: “How much confidence do you have in ….(1) parliament (2) business and industry (3) 
churches and religious organizations (4) courts and the legal system”. Possible answers were ”complete 
confidence”, “a great deal of confidence”, “some confidence”, “very little confidence” or “no confidence at all”.  
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that is, the confidence in parliament clearly rises with regional income and also (weakly) with 
relative income position. The Wald-test on the income variables supports the absolute income 
hypothesis and the subjective view that better institutions are found in wealthier nations. With 
respect to the confidence in courts, the decisiveness of the positional concerns is supported by 
the Wald-test evidence for the relative income hypothesis, which supports hypothesis 3. In 
addition, the marginal effect of the relative income variable of 2.6 percentage points is 
stronger by far than that observed for the regional subsistence income (about 1.5 percentage 
points). However, in addition to the  results in Table 1, the decreasing marginal confidence in 
the courts associated with a positive income distance possibly mirrors the decreasing marginal 
benefit of a well-functioning court system for persons above the regional average income.  
The measure ‘confidence in business’ appears unaffected by the level of regional 
economic development but increases with the distance between individual income and the 
regional subsistence level. Thus, positional concerns matter in the business arenas in which 
many individuals take part daily. However, yet again, the Wald-test results for the income 
variables do not support the relative income hypothesis. In line with our expectations 
(hypothesis 4), confidence in the church is completely unrelated to any income level (either 
absolute or relative). Thus, there is no positional concern effect on this institution, possibly 
reflecting its (presumably) non-profit nature.  
When the regional average income is used instead of the regional subsistence level 
(see Table 1a), the findings are quite similar, particularly for the confidence in churches. As 
regards the variable ‘confidence in business’, the average level of economic development 
appears to gain a weak positive momentum, but, on the other hand, the Wald-test now weakly 
rejects the absolute income hypothesis. Therefore, positional concerns appear better supported 
when the average income serves as a benchmark income, possibly because it tends to be the 
common comparison income in the business arena. Results for confidence in churches remain 
unchanged. 
 24
In sum, trust in the parliament appears to be driven by absolute wealth, but trust in 
courts and business, by the relative income position. Thus, the results are only partly 
consistent with hypothesis 3. On the other hand, trust in churches is independent of any type 
of income, which is in line with hypothesis 4. 
 
Compliance with Social Norms 
The next dimension of social capital, compliance with norms, is measured by tax morale, 
government benefit morale and the subjective right of a friend to unlawful testimony as 
protection against state prosecution.  
The first regressand, the ‘tax morale’ measure, relates to the respondent’s view on 
whether it is morally wrong to report income taxes incorrectly.12 The lowest category reflects 
the answer “not wrong”, while the highest category indicates “seriously wrong”. The 
estimates show that the overall regional income level has no impact on tax morale but that the 
level of incorrect reporting appears to increase with the distance between the individual’s 
equivalent income and the regional subsistence level. In other words, the closer people’s own 
earnings are to the subsistence level, the more prone they are not to report income taxes 
correctly. Thus, as predicted in hypothesis 5, envy and positional concerns on the part of the 
deprived decreases social capital in the form of tax morale. Interestingly, the income 
difference apparently exerts a considerable marginal effect on the highest tax morale (about 
3.9 percentage points).  
These results indicate that envy factors must be taken into account during tax system 
design and consideration of the relationship between taxpayers and the government (tax 
administration, in particular). The positive and weakly significant coefficient on the negative 
difference squared even suggests that the marginal tax morale increases with relative income 
                                                 
12 Original question: “Consider the situations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if…a taxpayer 
does not report all of [his/her] income in order to pay less income tax”. Possible answers were “not wrong”, “ a 
bit wrong”, “wrong” and “seriously wrong”. 
 25
for persons below the subsistence level. Nevertheless, because the Wald-test cannot reject the 
hypothesis of equal coefficients for both the subsistence and difference incomes, the absolute 
income hypothesis cannot be completely rejected. Again, using the regional average income 
instead of the subsistence level produces fairly similar estimation outcomes. The sole 
difference is that the coefficient of the negative distance squared (diff2neg) loses its 
significance, whereas the negative coefficient of the positive distance squared (diff2pos) 
becomes statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These estimates indicate that the 
propensity to report taxes honestly increases with an increase in relative income position, but 
at a decreasing rate.  
In the case of the second measure for compliance with social norms – whether it is 
morally wrong to give incorrect information to obtain government benefits13 – we observe 
that acceptance of cheating the government decreases with overall wealth as measured by the 
regional subsistence income. In addition, acceptance also declines with an increasing distance 
between the individual’s income and the regional subsistence level. In other words, the lower 
the individual’s relative income position, the higher the propensity to cheat the government, 
thereby, in line with hypothesis 5, destroying social capital. We also observe very high 
marginal effects – 10.3 percentage points for the highest compliance level. Moreover, the 
negative coefficient on the positive difference squared indicates a decreasing marginal 
propensity for compliance by those whose incomes are above the subsistence level. For this 
case, the Wald-tests indicate that the equality of the income variable coefficients cannot be 
rejected, meaning that the absolute income hypothesis seems to be supported. That is, social 
capital as measured by acceptance of cheating the government to obtain benefits decreases 
with absolute income level. Again, using the regional average income changes the results very 
                                                 
13 Original question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a person gives the government incorrect 
information about [himself/herself] to get government benefits that [he/she] is not entitled to”. The range of 
possible answers is the same as in the preceding footnote. 
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little; only the Wald-test on the income variables now supports the relative income hypothesis 
at the 10 percent level and equally rejects it at the 5 percent level. 
In the case of the regressand for the third social norm – whether close friends have the 
right to give wrongful testimony aimed at lowering their punishment – the lowest category 
reflects the answer “he has a definite right” and the highest, “he has no right”.14 Interestingly, 
both wealth in society and a better relative individual income position appear deleterious to 
the perceived rights of a friend, thereby positively affecting obeisance to the law. This result 
might reflect perception of the state in poor countries as an opponent of the people, meaning 
that willingness not to comply with the rules is more widespread. However, when the distance 
between individual income and subsistence level is positive, the second derivative appears to 
be negative – that is, against obedience to the law. In this estimation, the Wald-test on the 
income variables is more in favour of the absolute income hypothesis, which contradicts 
hypothesis 5. Specifically, an increase in absolute income is associated with an increase in 
compliance with the law. When the reference income is changed, the coefficient of the 
absolute wealth level becomes strongly significant; however, the significance level of the 
income distance variable completely breaks down. Again, even though the Wald-test does not 
reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients, absolute income seems to matter for 
propensity to comply with the law.   
Overall, the results obtained for the social norm ‘compliance’ indicate an overall 
tendency for hypothesis 5 not to be rejected. However, the importance of positional concerns 
varies among the variables investigated.  
 
Social Networks 
                                                 
14 The questionnaire describes the following situation: “Suppose you were riding in a car driven by a close 
friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a pedestrian. He asks you to tell the police that he was obeying the 
speed limit. Which statement comes closest to your belief about what your friend has a right to expect from 
you?”. Possible answers were “My friend has a DEFINITE right as a friend to expect me to testify that he was 
obeying the speed limit”, “My friend has SOME right as a friend to expect me to testify that he was obeying the 
speed limit” or “My friend has NO right as a friend to expect me to testify that he was obeying the speed limit”. 
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The last set of regressands is linked to social networks that form a decisive part of social 
capital. These are measured particularly by the frequency of the interviewee’s voluntary 
participation in politics, charitable activities, religious activities and other kinds of voluntary 
work. Again, a higher value for the dependent variable reflects more frequent involvement in 
such activities.15
The regression results shows no influence of the regional subsistence level on the 
propensity to engage in voluntary work in politics. Moreover, the coefficient on the relative 
income position is weakly significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that persons with a 
relatively lower income than their peers are more politically active. Such involvement may 
occur because political engagement can serve as a means to improve one’s own social 
position through rent-seeking activities, gains in reputation and influence on the political 
decision-making process. This finding supports hypothesis 6. Since the Wald-test does not 
reject the equality of the income variable coefficients, the absolute income level might also be 
decisive. For positive differences in income, the second derivative appears to be positive, 
indicating an increasing marginal activity level of income. However, employing the regional 
average income as a benchmark yields a completely different picture (see Table 1a) – neither 
the absolute wealth level nor positional concerns appear to matter for political engagement. 
Only the marginal propensity shows an apparent increase for positive income differences, 
although weakly and only at the 10 percent significance level.  
As the significant coefficient on the regional subsistence level indicates, voluntary 
work in charity organizations such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army appears to 
increase with overall social wealth. On the other hand, as for political involvement, the 
                                                 
15 Related question: “Have you done any voluntary activity in the last 12 months in any of the following areas? 
Voluntary activity is unpaid work, not just belonging to an organization or group. It should be of service or 
benefit to other people or the community and not only to one’s family or personal friends. During the last 12 
months, did you do volunteer work in any of the following areas: (a) Political activities (helping political parties, 
political movements, election campaigns, etc.), (b) charitable activities (helping the sick, elderly, poor, etc.), (c) 
religion and church-related activities (helping churches and religious groups), and (d) any other kind of 
voluntary activities?”. Possible answers were (1) no, (2), yes, once or twice, (3) yes, 3–5 times, (4) yes, 6 or 
more times. When answering these questions, respondents were asked to list one voluntary activity only once, 
even when several categories might apply.  
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frequency of such activities decreases with an increase in the relative income position but 
with much higher marginal effects (2.1 percentage compared to 0.4 percentage points). 
Nevertheless, the Wald-test on the two income variables supports the view that it is the 
relative income position and not the absolute individual income level that matters. Obviously, 
no detrimental effect of envy exists here; rather, as predicted by hypothesis 6, persons with a 
low or middle relative income position become socially active. Admittedly, those with a 
higher income may face tighter time constraints; however, it might also be that persons with a 
relatively low income prefer to actively engage in a cooperative re-distributive equilibrium 
activity among their peers rather than support such organizations financially. In addition, for 
this dimension of social capital, we observe that the estimation results are comparable to those 
based on the regional average income. The only difference is that for positive income 
distances the propensity to become socially active decreases, but at an increasing rate. 
Religious activities seem to increase with the absolute (regional) subsistence level. 
The wealthier a region, the more active people are in voluntary work for religious 
organizations. In contrast, the relative income position does not appear to matter at all, which 
contradicts hypothesis 6. Nevertheless, the Wald-test on the income variables is rather in 
favour of the relative income hypothesis. It is noteworthy that a change in the reference 
income brings positional concerns into more prominence; that is, relatively richer persons 
now have a lower propensity to become involved in religious organizations. Moreover, the 
Wald-test still favours the relative income hypothesis. In addition, the negative income 
distance squared becomes now weakly statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In other 
words, the observed pattern is very similar to that for engagement in charity organizations. 
Finally, the frequency of activities in other kinds of voluntary work appears to increase 
with the regional level of economic wealth, although the distance between individual income 
and the regional subsistence level does not appear to influence such involvement. Hence, such 
activity seems not to be influenced by envy. Nevertheless, the Wald-test on the income 
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variables somewhat supports the relative income hypothesis. Interestingly, positive 
differences in income have a negative marginal value of relative income, indicating less social 
engagement. Moreover, results based on the regional average income, rather than the 
subsistence level (see Table 1a), indicate that the relative income position then becomes 
decisive (at the 5 percent level), which is also supported by the Wald-test. Specifically, the 
coefficient indicates that a higher relative position in society leads to fewer volunteer 
activities. Thus, in this specification, the coefficient on the second income derivative becomes 
an unimportant factor.  
 Overall, for social engagement in charity, religious or other organizations, relative 
income becomes decisive when the regional average income rather than the regional 
subsistence level is used as the benchmark. In contrast, when the focus is on the subsistence 
level rather than the relative income position, only the general wealth level appears to matter 
for religious and other social engagement. Under both benchmark specifications, political 
activities alone appear somewhat related to absolute or relative individual income position. 
Thus, it can be argued that these estimation results are only partially consistent with 
hypothesis 6. 
 
 
5.2. National Income as the Benchmark of Comparison 
 
By outlining the estimates for both the subsistence and average incomes measured at the 
national level, Tables 2 and 2a illustrate the different results when the reference group is 
changed – that is, when the relative individual income position is measured with respect to the 
national rather than the regional situation. The following discussion focuses particularly on 
these differences, with the regional income as the income of comparison.  
The results for happiness are almost the same for both national subsistence and 
average income with respect to direction of influence, significance levels and the Wald-test on 
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income variables. Again, the size of the marginal impact of the relative income position 
declines when the average income measure serves as the benchmark income. As regards the 
variables relating to level of social trust among the country’s residents, the observed impacts 
of the subsistence level and relative income position variables are again virtually identical for 
both incomes, which holds equally true for the estimated squared terms. In addition, the 
marginal effects are quantitatively consistent, with a certain decline in the average income 
impact for both regional and national cases but no clear tendency for positional concerns to 
work more strongly in the regional than in the national context.  
For trust in institutions, the direction of the (significant) income variables’ impact on 
the four measures is more or less as observed for the regional case. Identical results are 
obtained for confidence in the church (in which income never plays a role) and confidence in 
business, for which an increase in significance level is again observed when average income 
in place of subsistence income is used.   
Differences do emerge, however, with respect to trust in parliament and the courts. For 
confidence in parliament, some changes occur in the significance levels but only at the 10 
percent level. Most particularly, relative income position seems to matter for both regional 
average income (Table 1a) and national subsistence level (Table 2), but not for the other two 
cases. This result indicates that envy is weakly associated with a lower level of confidence in 
the legislating institution. With respect to confidence in courts, a higher national subsistence 
income is associated with less confidence, while the national average income variable is 
insignificant. Interestingly, this result does not replicate the results for regional income, in 
which general wealth is apparently never decisive. Again however, the relative income 
position always matters, and the smallest marginal effect and lowest significance level occur 
when the subsistence income is used. In this case, the Wald-test supports the absolute income 
hypothesis, even though for the remaining regressions on court confidence the relative income 
hypothesis holds.  
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As regards compliance with social norms, for the tax and benefit morale questions, we 
report qualitatively identical results for the income variables in all four models except for a 10 
percent significance level for the diff2pos variable when the regional average income is used. 
The marginal impacts of the relative income position are comparably large for all four 
regression models, and the Wald-tests cannot reject the null hypothesis in any model. 
However, when the right of a friend is the regressand and the national subsistence level is 
used, the relative income position – unlike the regional subsistence level which is significant 
at the 5 percent level – misses significance at the 10 percent level. The remaining results, 
however, are robust no matter which income is used.  
When the focus is social networks (frequency of participation in voluntary work), the 
income variables based on the national subsistence level show exactly the same pattern and 
similar quantitative effects as those for the regional benchmark model. In addition, the size of 
the income impact is almost identical when the national concept is employed, with the sole 
exception of a 10 percent significance of diff2pos in the voluntary political involvement 
regression model (Table 1a).  
In sum, looking at both benchmark models, we find in many cases that, in line with 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), income comparisons are not symmetric and any income effect is 
not per se linear. There is also a stronger tendency towards decreasing marginal utility for 
incomes above the subsistence level than for those below. Moreover, the findings using two 
different reference groups are robust and consistent: the estimation outcome does not change 
substantially no matter whether regional or national income variables are employed. Thus, in 
terms of a stronger envy or positional concern effect, we observe no general tendency when 
the regional benchmark model is used. Moreover, for most social capital dimensions, the 
direction of impact is consistent whether the subsistence level or average income situation is 
used as a reference. Differences do occur, however, with respect to the marginal impact, 
which appears larger when the subsistence level is employed as the benchmark income.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
The importance of relative preferences is not a new concept. However, empirical evidence on 
the extent to which relative income position matters in different aspects of life is relatively 
rare. Moreover, most empirical studies to date focus on its impact on happiness. Nevertheless, 
two laboratory experiments have investigated the consequences of positional concerns for 
individuals’ social behaviour (see, e.g., Kirchsteiger, 1994), and some field studies indicate 
the influence of relative income position on, for example, employer performance or 
employment decisions (see, e.g., Torgler et al., 2005; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998).   
Paldam (2000) correctly points out that the social capital literature is a “new field, 
[but] suffering from a great lack of good, reliable data. Both time series and cross-country 
evidence are missing. In the meantime much speculation is going on” (p. 649). This current 
international cross-sectional study, using the rich ISSP 1998 international data covering 25 
countries and about 24,000 individuals, goes beyond several previous studies that, because 
they focus on a single country, are unable to abstract the impact of cultural differences. Thus, 
our paper contributes to the social capital literature in general and the cross-sectional research 
in particular by (1) analyzing the impact of relative income position on social capital and (2) 
using 14 different questions to measure social capital along four different dimensions: general 
trust between people, trust in institutions, compliance with social norms and voluntary 
activities. We also include self-reported happiness, which serves as our benchmark measure.  
In general, we find empirical support for relative income position’s relevance for 
social capital. In most cases, we find the coefficient measuring an interviewee’s relative 
income position statistically significant, with considerable marginal effects. Only compliance 
with criminal law (e.g. giving wrong testimony to protect a friend), confidence in parliament, 
and voluntary work for political, religious or other organizations appear to be (at least partly) 
free of positional concerns, at least in some model specifications. Most particularly, 
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confidence in churches appears unrelated to either average wealth or relative income, 
independent of reference income measurement.  
The social capital measures most strongly affected quantitatively by the relative 
income position include compliance with social norms (e.g. paying taxes or not unjustifiably 
claiming government benefits) and generalized trust (with a marginal effect up to 10 
percentage points). For all these measures, social capital rises with relative income or, in other 
words, declines with growing envy. We also find substantial effects for trust in the courts and 
the justice system, institutions which are less related than some others to the current politico-
economic process. Obviously, these institutions, like the important environments of business 
and industry in which many citizens interact and work in their daily life, are more vulnerable 
to an envy effect. As regards individual participation in voluntary organizations, when an 
income disadvantage exists (compared to the reference income), a stronger effect of the 
relative income position become prominent, together with stronger social involvement.  
For most models, it is also impossible to completely reject either the relative or the 
absolute income hypothesis. Moreover, in many cases, we find evidence that the relative 
income effect is not symmetrical with or linear to the tendency of decreasing marginal utility 
for incomes above the reference level. Most surprisingly, the majority of findings are 
consistent even in the absence of qualitatively different effects for one specific benchmark 
model: that is, most results are fairly robust to a change in reference groups – national versus 
regional and subsistence versus average income level. Only the marginal impacts of the 
positional variable appear more sizeable when the subsistence income serves as the reference 
income.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 
Regional Subsistence Income as a Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
 
Happiness 
  
Advantage 
  
Generalized 
trust  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.195* 0.047 0.226* 0.051 0.084 0.006 
 (2.25)  (2.55)  (0.90)  
Difference 0.272** 0.066 0.150* 0.034 0.242** 0.018 
 (4.40)  (2.18)  (4.12)  
diff2neg -1.009 -0.245 0.413 0.093 1.605(*) 0.120 
 (0.92)  (0.54)  (1.69)  
diff2pos -0.058** -0.014 -0.040(*) -0.009 -0.057** -0.004 
 (2.81)  (1.84)  (3.01)  
Observations 24166  22509  24290  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.43  0.29  1.43 
 
Prob > chi2  0.5141  0.5872  0.2322  
Pseudo R2 0.0790  0.0493  0.0623  
Ordered probit estimation with clustering by regions. Marginal effects calculated at the average for the highest 
category of the social capital variable. *, **, and (*) denote significances at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 1a 
Regional Average Income as Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
 
Happiness 
  
Advantage 
  
Generalized 
trust  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.186** 0.045 0.152** 0.034 0.128** 0.010 
 (4.95)  (5.11)  (3.78)  
Difference 0.179** 0.044 0.037 0.008 0.144** 0.011 
 (4.44)  (0.62)  (2.75)  
diff2neg 0.012 0.003 -0.06 -0.013 0.032 0.002 
 (0.22)  (0.99)  (0.45)  
diff2pos -0.049** -0.012 -0.022 -0.005 -0.055(*) -0.004 
 (2.83)  (0.67)  (1.84)  
Observations 24166  22509  24290  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.01  2.98(*)  0.06 
 
Prob > chi2  0.9165  0.0841  0.8140  
Pseudo R2 0.6787  0.0492  0.0621  
Ordered probit estimation with clustering by regions. Marginal effects calculated at the average for the highest 
category of the social capital variable. *, **, and (*) denote significances at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Regional Subsistence Income: Confidence in State Institutions 
 Parliament  Courts  Business  Church  
 Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
Income 0.036 0.010 -0.105 -0.023 -0.049 -0.010 -0.094 -0.023 
 (0.57)  (1.25)  (0.76)  (1.21)  
Difference 0.078 0.021 0.070* 0.015 0.101* 0.020 -0.02 -0.005 
 (1.54)  (2.09)  (2.10)  (0.48)  
diff2neg 0.716 0.190 -0.211 -0.046 -0.103 -0.020 -0.765 -0.184 
 (1.03)  (0.31)  (0.12)  (0.96)  
diff2pos -0.017 -0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.001 
 (1.15)  (0.06)  (0.25)  (0.25)  
Observations 23690  23810  23279  23615  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.15  2.64  2.15  0.52 
 
Prob > chi2  0.6970  0.1040  0.1424  0.4719  
Pseudo R2 0.0056  0.0057  0.0056  0.0097  
 
 
 
Table 1a (cont.) 
Regional Average Income: Confidence in State Institutions 
 Parliament  Courts  Business  Church  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.044** 0.012 -0.001 -0.001 0.037(*) 0.007 -0.044 -0.011 
 (2.68)  (0.02)  (1.82)  (1.51)  
Difference 0.062(*) 0.017 0.119** 0.026 0.107** 0.021 -0.025 -0.006 
 (1.72)  (5.03)  (3.01)  (0.72)  
diff2neg 0.034 0.009 0.046 0.010 0.016 0.003 -0.032 -0.008 
 (0.60)  (1.37)  (0.28)  (0.58)  
diff2pos -0.022 -0.006 -0.026* -0.006 -0.008 -0.002 0.007 0.002 
 (1.34)  (2.46)  (0.45)  (0.49)  
Observations 23690  23810  23279  23615  
Wald-test  
(income - difference) 0.16  8.09**  2.77(*) 
 
0.13  
Prob > chi2  0.6850  0.0044  0.0961  0.7157  
Pseudo R2 0.0056  0.0057  0.0056  0.0097  
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Regional Subsistence Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 Tax morale  Benefit morale  Right of friend  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.003 0.001 0.288* 0.114 0.219(*) 0.070 
 (0.03)  (2.28)  (1.70)  
Difference 0.107* 0.039 0.260** 0.103 0.120* 0.038 
 (2.56)  (4.78)  (2.11)  
diff2neg 0.741(*) 0.270 -0.183 -0.072 -1.158 -0.370 
 (1.71)  (0.32)  (1.41)  
diff2pos -0.014 -0.005 -0.056** -0.022 -0.034* -0.011 
 (1.10)  (3.24)  (2.23)  
Observations 23969  24193  22301  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.86  0.04  0.45  
Prob > chi2  0.3529  0.8470  0.5027  
Pseudo R2 0.0216  0.0336  0.0539  
 
 
 
Table 1a (cont.) 
Regional Average Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 Tax morale  Benefit morale  Right of friend  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.048 0.018 0.234** 0.093 0.145** 0.046 
 (1.49)  (4.65)  (2.69)  
Difference 0.117** 0.043 0.112* 0.044 0.0003 -0.0001 
 (3.45)  (2.33)  (0.01)  
diff2neg 0.067 0.024 -0.095(*) -0.037 -0.135 -0.043 
 (1.55)  (1.87)  (1.52)  
diff2pos -0.027(*) -0.010 -0.035* -0.014 -0.014 -0.004 
 (1.67)  (2.02)  (0.65)  
Observations 23969  24193  22301  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 2.17  2.98(*)  3.73(*)  
Prob > chi2  0.1410  0.0844  0.0536  
Pseudo R2 0.0217  0.0335  0.0539  
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Regional Subsistence Income: Voluntary Work 
 Politics  Charity  Religion  Other  
 Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
Income 0.052 0.002 0.607** 0.076 0.572** 0.023 0.378** 0.049 
 (0.43)  (3.02)  (4.19)  (3.54)  
Difference -0.147(*) -0.004 -0.164* -0.021 -0.012 -0.001 0.069 0.009 
 (1.96)  (2.21)  (0.14)  (1.44)  
diff2neg -0.176 -0.005 -1.784 -0.223 -0.025 -0.001 1.402 0.181 
 (0.13)  (1.31)  (0.02)  (1.43)  
diff2pos 0.047* 0.001 0.026 0.003 -0.029 -0.001 -0.043** -0.006 
 (2.10)  (1.02)  (1.13)  (2.62)  
Observations 24362  24396  24330  24172  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 1.43 
 
10.90** 
 
10.51** 
 
5.78* 
 
Prob > chi2  0.2323  0.0010  0.0012  0.0162  
Pseudo R2 0.0609  0.0565  0.2149  0.0798  
 
 
 
Table 1a (cont.) 
Regional Average Income: Voluntary Work 
 Politics  Charity  Religion  Other  
 Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
Income -0.043 -0.001 0.164* 0.021 0.203** 0.008 0.159** 0.021 
 (0.96)  (2.08)  (3.72)  (3.58)  
Difference -0.054 -0.002 -0.221** -0.028 -0.176* -0.007 -0.116* -0.015 
 (0.73)  (3.66)  (2.34)  (2.21)  
diff2neg 0.073 0.002 -0.111 -0.014 -0.141(*) -0.006 -0.099 -0.013 
 (0.74)  (1.03)  (1.81)  (1.42)  
diff2pos 0.055(*) 0.002 0.088** 0.011 0.036 0.001 0.019 0.002 
 (1.71)  (3.44)  (1.04)  (0.93)  
Observations 24362  24396  24330  24172  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.02  14.03*** 18.96***  18.49*** 
Prob > chi2  0.9011  0.0002 0.0000  0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0610  0.0568 0.2149  0.0796 
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Table 2 
National Subsistence Income as the Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
 Happiness  Advantage  Generalized trust  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.219** 0.053 0.206* 0.046 0.058 0.004 
 (2.70)  (2.22)  (0.61)  
Difference 0.260** 0.063 0.160* 0.036 0.259** 0.019 
 (4.47)  (2.29)  (4.46)  
diff2neg -0.588 -0.143 0.431 0.097 1.791(*) 0.133 
 (0.55)  (0.56)  (1.80)  
diff2pos -0.054** -0.013 -0.041(*) -0.009 -0.061** -0.005 
 (2.79)  (1.92)  (3.27)  
Observations 24166  22509  24290  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.14 
 
0.10 
 
2.29 
 
Prob > chi2  0.7117  0.7512  0.1306  
Pseudo R2 0.0790  0.0493  0.0623  
Ordered probit estimation with clustering by countries. Marginal effects calculated at the average for the highest  
category of the social capital variable. *, **, and (*) denote significances at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels,  
respectively. 
 
 
 
Table 2a 
National Average Income as the Benchmark for Social Comparison:  Social Trust 
 
Happiness 
  
Advantage 
  
Generalized 
trust  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.187** 0.046 0.153** 0.034 0.131** 0.010 
 (5.08)  (5.27)  (3.79)  
Difference 0.188** 0.046 0.024 0.005 0.131* 0.010 
 (4.15)  (0.42)  (2.45)  
diff2neg 0.054 0.013 -0.094 -0.021 -0.009 -0.001 
 (0.76)  (1.46)  (0.12)  
diff2pos -0.048* -0.012 -0.015 -0.003 -0.051(*) -0.004 
 (2.57)  (0.52)  (1.80)  
Observations 24166  22509  24290  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.00  4.20*  0.00  
Prob > chi2  0.9976  0.0405  0.9992  
Pseudo R2 0.0787  0.0492  0.0621  
Ordered probit estimation with clustering by countries. Marginal effects calculated at the average for the highest 
category of the social capital variable. *, **, and (*) denote significances at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
National Subsistence Income: Confidence in State Institutions 
 Parliament  Courts  Business  Church  
 Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
Income 0.022 0.006 -0.160* -0.035 -0.057 -0.011 -0.100 -0.024 
 (0.35)  (2.00)  (0.85)  (1.30)  
Difference 0.093(*) 0.025 0.099** 0.021 0.107* 0.021 -0.016 -0.004 
 (1.89)  (3.14)  (2.20)  (0.36)  
diff2neg 1.042(*) 0.277 0.072 0.016 -0.087 -0.017 -0.737 -0.177 
 (1.92)  (0.11)  (0.10)  (0.86)  
diff2pos -0.021 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (1.42)  (0.65)  (0.39)  (0.14)  
Observations 23690  23810  23279  23615  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.45 
 
6.63** 
 
2.40 
 
0.65 
 
Prob > chi2  0.5015  0.0100  0.1213  0.4211  
Pseudo R2 0.0056  0.0057  0.0056  0.0097  
 
 
 
Table 2a (cont.) 
National Average Income: Confidence in State Institutions 
 Parliament  Courts  Business  Church  
 Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
Income 0.048** 0.013 -0.01 -0.002 0.036(*) 0.007 -0.044 -0.011 
 (2.75)  (0.35)  (1.77)  (1.52)  
Difference 0.058 0.016 0.120** 0.026 0.107** 0.021 -0.026 -0.006 
 (1.47)  (4.76)  (3.34)  (0.79)  
diff2neg 0.013 0.004 0.032 0.007 0.009 0.002 -0.042 -0.010 
 (0.20)  (1.00)  (0.20)  (0.78)  
diff2pos -0.024 -0.006 -0.023* -0.005 -0.01 -0.002 0.006 0.001 
 (1.36)  (2.14)  (0.58)  (0.36)  
Observations 23690  23810  23279  23615  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.04  10.16**  3.50(*)  0.13  
Prob > chi2  0.8392  0.0014  0.0613  0.7136  
Pseudo R2 0.0056  0.0058  0.0056  0.0097  
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Table 2 (cont.) 
National Subsistence Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 Tax morale  Benefit morale  Right of friend  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income -0.014 -0.005 0.264* 0.105 0.239(*) 0.076 
 (0.15)  (2.00)  (1.73)  
Difference 0.119** 0.044 0.273** 0.108 0.112 0.036 
 (2.93)  (5.17)  (1.61)  
diff2neg 0.986* 0.360 -0.196 -0.078 -1.282 -0.409 
 (2.17)  (0.35)  (1.64)  
diff2pos -0.017 -0.006 -0.058** -0.023 -0.032(*) -0.010 
 (1.37)  (3.41)  (1.80)  
Observations 23969  24193  22301  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 1.33  0.00  0.54 
 
Prob > chi2  0.2479  0.9551  0.4641  
Pseudo R2 0.0217  0.0336  0.0539  
 
 
 
Table 2a (cont.) 
National Average Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 Tax morale  Benefit morale  Right of friend  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income 0.046 0.017 0.232** 0.092 0.159** 0.051 
 (1.40)  (4.47)  (3.00)  
Difference 0.121** 0.044 0.116* 0.046 -0.049 -0.016 
 (3.34)  (2.53)  (0.94)  
diff2neg 0.067 0.024 -0.104(*) -0.041 -0.212* -0.068 
 (1.33)  (1.92)  (2.53)  
diff2pos -0.028 -0.010 -0.034(*) -0.014 0.002 0.001 
 (1.60)  (1.92)  (0.08)  
Observations 23969  24193  22301  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 2.22  2.60  8.57**  
Prob > chi2  0.1364  0.1068  0.0034  
Pseudo R2 0.0217  0.0335  0.0540  
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Table 2 (cont.) 
National Subsistence Income: Voluntary Work 
 Politics  Charity  Religion  Other  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff.
Income 0.044 0.001 0.681** 0.085 0.629** 0.025 0.435** 0.056 
 (0.35)  (3.53)  (4.20)  (3.90)  
Difference -0.134(*) -0.004 -0.195** -0.024 -0.038 -0.002 0.045 0.006 
 (1.71)  (2.80)  (0.46)  (0.89)  
diff2neg -0.043 -0.001 -2.143 -0.268 -0.403 -0.016 1.340 0.173 
 (0.03)  (1.49)  (0.36)  (1.31)  
diff2pos 0.043(*) 0.001 0.033 0.004 -0.022 -0.001 -0.037* -0.005 
 (1.82)  (1.42)  (0.87)  (2.37)  
Observations 24362  24396  24330  24172  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 1.04 
 
15.99** 
 
11.29** 
 
7.97* 
 
Prob > chi2  0.3068  0.0001  0.0008  0.0048  
Pseudo R2 0.0608  0.0569  0.2151  0.0800  
 
 
 
Table 2a (cont.) 
National Average Income: Voluntary Work 
 Politics  Charity  Religion  Other  
 Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. 
Income -0.038 -0.001 0.179* 0.022 0.222** 0.009 0.176** 0.023 
 (0.83)  (2.31)  (3.99)  (4.20)  
Difference -0.071 -0.002 -0.218** -0.027 -0.202* -0.008 -0.129* -0.017 
 (0.84)  (3.73)  (2.41)  (2.20)  
diff2neg 0.032 0.001 -0.094 -0.012 -0.184* -0.007 -0.116 -0.015 
 (0.27)  (0.97)  (2.05)  (1.53)  
diff2pos 0.057 0.002 0.082** 0.010 0.04 0.002 0.017 0.002 
 (1.56)  (3.37)  (1.13)  (0.84)  
Observations 24362  24396  24330  24172  
Wald-test  
(income – difference) 0.11  15.48**  18.79**  19.97**  
Prob > chi2  0.7374  0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  
Pseudo R2 0.0609  0.0571  0.2152  0.0799  
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Table A1  
Description of Control Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Based on the VWS variables 
Regional subsistence 
income/10000 24166 0.3735 0.6486 0.0000 2.2344 
OECD 
equivalized 
V216 
Difference from regional 
subsistence income/10000 24166 0.0014 0.3799 -1.9946 5.9116 See above
Difference squared  
if income < 0 24166 0.0537 0.2269 0.0000 3.9784 See above
Difference squared  
if income > 0 24166 0.0906 0.6104 0.0000 34.9467 See above
   
National subsistence income/ 
10000 24166 0.3732 0.6443 0.0000336 24166 See above
Difference from national 
subsistence. income/10000  24166 0.0016 0.3865 -1.7924 24166 See above
Difference squared  
if income < 0 24166 0.0546 0.2232 0.0000 24166 See above
Difference squared  
if income > 0 24166 0.0948 0.6333 0.0000 24166 See above
   
Regional average income/ 
10000 24166 0.3735 0.6486 0.0000 2.2344 See above
Difference from regional  
income/10000 24166 0.0014 0.3799 -1.9946 5.9116 See above
Difference squared  
if income < 0 24166 0.0537 0.2269 0.0000 3.9784 See above
Difference squared  
if income > 0 24166 0.0906 0.6104 0.0000 34.9467 See above
   
National average income/ 
10000 24166 0.3732 0.6443 0.0000 1.9632 See above
Difference from national 
average income/10000  24166 0.0016 0.3865 -1.7924 5.8669 See above
Difference squared  
if income < 0 24166 0.0546 0.2232 0.0000 3.2129 See above
Difference squared  
if income > 0 24166 0.0948 0.6333 0.0000 34.4201 See above
   
Female 24166 0.5322 0.4990 0 1 V200
Age 30–39 24166 0.2204 0.4145 0 1 V201
Age 40–49 24166 0.1955 0.3966 0 1 V201
Age 50–59 24166 0.1594 0.3661 0 1 V201
Age 60–69 24166 0.1391 0.3460 0 1 V201
Age 70–79 24166 0.0812 0.2731 0 1 V201
Age 80 24166 0.0147 0.1205 0 1 V201
Level of education 24166 4.5664 1.4641 1 7 V205
Level of education squared 24166 22.9955 13.5845 1 49 V205
Single 24166 0.1888 0.3913 0 1 V202
Separated or divorced 24166 0.0742 0.2620 0 1 V202
Widowed 24166 0.0874 0.2825 0 1 V202
attendance of relig. services 24166 2.3303 2.0161 1 9 V59
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Table A1  
Description of Variables and Summary Statistics (cont.) 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Based on the VWS variables 
Catholic 24166 0.4179 0.4932 0 1 V217
Jewish 24166 0.0309 0.1730 0 1 V217
Protestant 24166 0.2006 0.4005 0 1 V217
Orthodox 24166 0.0583 0.2343 0 1 V217
No religion 24166 0.2335 0.4230 0 1 V217
Buddhist 24166 0.0158 0.1249 0 1 V217
Muslim 24166 0.0109 0.1039 0 1 V217
Urban 24166 0.4827 0.4997 0 1 
Community type 
variables 
Rural area 24166 0.2821 0.4500 0 1 See above
Self-employed 24166 0.0927 0.2899 0 1 V206
Unemployed 24166 0.0545 0.2269 0 1 V206
Retired 24166 0.1950 0.3962 0 1 V206
Housewife 24166 0.1025 0.3033 0 1 V206
Disabled 24166 0.0211 0.1437 0 1 V206
Out of labour force 24166 0.0107 0.1028 0 1 V206
Germanic language 24166 0.1849 0.3882 0 1 V3
Romance language 24166 0.2199 0.4142 0 1 V3
Northern Germanic language 24166 0.1213 0.3265 0 1 V3
Balto-Slavic countries 24166 0.2957 0.4563 0 1 V3
Other non-English language 24166 0.1208 0.3259 0 1 V3
This table is based on the number of observations in the happiness regressions. 
 
 
 
Table A2 
Description of Dependent Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Based on the VWS variables 
Happiness 24166 2.8995 0.7370 1 4 V4  
Advantage 22509 2.6645 0.8606 1 4 V18
Generalized trust 24290 2.2681 0.8022 1 4 V19
Confidence in parliament 23690 2.4466 1.4098 1 5 V20
Confidence in courts 23810 2.5375 1.2656 1 5 V21
Confidence in business 23279 2.3072 1.2222 1 5 V22
Confidence in church 23615 2.7124 1.3285 1 5 V23
Tax morale 23969 2.9641 0.9445 1 4 V16
Benefit morale 24193 3.3926 0.7923 1 4 V17
Right of friends 22301 2.6728 0.5922 1 3 V6
Voluntary work – politics 24362 1.1082 0.4624 1 4 V32
Voluntary work – charity 24396 1.4560 0.9049 1 4 V33
Voluntary work – religion 24330 1.2749 0.7499 1 4 V34
Other voluntary work 24172 1.4566 0.9369 1 4 V35
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Table A3  
Descriptive Statistics for the 25 Countries Included 
Country Freq. Percent Germanic Romance Northern Germanic 
Balto- 
Slavic Other 
Germany 1,460 6.04 1 0 0 0 0
Austria 656 2.71 1 0 0 0 0
Hungary 817 3.38 0 0 0 1 0
Italy 601 2.49 0 1 0 0 0
Netherlands 1,425 5.9 1 0 0 0 0
Norway 1,237 5.12 0 0 1 0 0
Sweden 848 3.51 0 0 1 0 0
Czech Republic 690 2.86 0 0 0 1 0
Slovenia 675 2.79 0 0 0 1 0
Poland 963 3.98 0 0 0 1 0
Bulgaria 937 3.88 0 0 0 1 0
Russia 963 3.98 0 0 0 1 0
New Zealand 777 3.22 0 0 0 0 0
Canada 610 2.52 0 0 0 0 0
Philippines 1,063 4.4 0 0 0 0 1
Israel 829 3.43 0 0 0 0 1
Japan 1,028 4.25 0 0 0 0 1
Spain 1,552 6.42 0 1 0 0 0
Latvia 980 4.06 0 0 0 1 0
Slovak Republic 1,120 4.63 0 0 0 1 0
France 855 3.54 0 1 0 0 0
Portugal 1,069 4.42 0 1 0 0 0
Chile 1,237 5.12 0 1 0 0 0
Denmark 846 3.5 0 0 1 0 0
Switzerland 928 3.84 1 0 0 0 0
        
Total 24,166 100      
Number of countries and observations based on the happiness regression model. 
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